Abstract-The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging paradigm that allows a fine-grained and autonomous control of the surrounding environment. This is achieved through a large number of devices that collaboratively perform complex tasks. To date, IoT networks are used in a variety of critical scenarios and therefore their security has become a primary concern. A robust technique to enhance the integrity of remote devices is called Remote Attestation (RA). However, classic RA schemes require a central and powerful entity, called Verifier, that manages the entire process of attestation. This makes the entire system dependent on an external entity and inevitably introduces a single point of failure.
In our work, we present SAFE d : the first concrete solution to self-attest autonomous networks of heterogeneous embedded devices. SAFE d overcomes the limitations of the previous works by spreading the duties of the Verifier among all the devices in a scalable way. In our schema, the information needed for the attestation phase are replicated inside the network, thus raising the bar to accomplish an attack. As a result, the IoT network can self-inspect its integrity and self-recover in case of attack, without the need of an external entity. Our proposal exploits the security guarantees offered by ARM TrustZone chips to perform a decentralized attestation protocol based on an enhanced version of a distributed hash table.
We implemented a prototype of SAFE d for the Raspberry Pi platform to evaluate the feasibility and the security properties of our protocol. Moreover, we measured the scalable properties of SAFE d by using a large network of virtual devices. The results show that SAFE d can detect infected devices and recover up to 99.7% of its initial status in case of faults or attacks. Moreover, we managed to protect 50 devices with a logarithmic overhead on the network and on the devices' memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a set of new technologies that allow building sophisticated applications by using groups of small devices. IoT world revolves around three cardinal concepts: (i) a decentralized network which can be accessed remotely through the Internet, (ii) heterogeneous devices that collaborate autonomously, and (iii) interaction with the physical environment through sensors and actuators. This approach has several applications that range from industrial control systems [29] to small home-appliances [31] .
To enhance the security properties of IoT networks, Remote Attestation (RA) techniques have been proposed. Classic RA approaches require a trusted entity (i.e., Verifier) that attests (i.e., verifies) a remote one (i.e., Prover). It is usually assumed that the Verifier has powerful capabilities and is physically isolated from the network, thus protected by any threat (e.g., a remote server in a controlled area); the Prover, instead, might be any device inside the network and can be tampered by a potential attacker. During an attestation process, the Verifier sends a challenge to the Prover and receives a measure of its status as a report (e.g., an application fingerprint). The Verifier then compares the measurement with a database of proofs previously saved to check the correctness of the Prover status. This approach, often defined as single-verifier RA, is well-established but needs to be extended to address the novel challenges offered by IoT networks (heterogeneity, scalability, dynamicity).
To fill the gap, researchers proposed swarm attestation [8] , [6] , [20] , [13] , [21] as a solution for verifying groups of heterogeneous devices (swarm) during a single challenge. These proposals build a spanning tree over the network and use it to propagate the attestation request and to aggregate the resulting reports. Also, they assume the presence of a trusted and powerful Verifier which is placed at the root of the tree and manages the attestation process. This setting suffers from four main limitations: (i) the Verifier must be connected to the swarm, (ii) the Verifier must contain all the proofs, (iii) the Verifier is a single point of failure inside the system and (iv) the aggregation process is either producing poor reports or computationally unfeasible for low-end embedded devices. Furthermore, a network of embedded devices cannot be completely autonomous due to the introduction of a central powerful entity, thus breaking the IoT paradigm. Steps toward autonomous systems were proposed recently with [2] , [19] , [22] . However, [2] relies on heuristics and considers only homogeneous devices, while [19] , [22] do not fully address scalability and single point-of-failure issues.
In this paper, we propose SAFE d : the first concrete selfattestation for autonomous networks of heterogeneous embedded devices. SAFE d introduces a completely new approach that enables a swarm of IoT devices to validate themself without the need for a central Verifier. Our solution allows to achieve several desirable properties:
• No single point of failure: each device inside the network can be a Verifier, thus increasing the difficulty for an attacker to corrupt the attestation process.
• Self-protection: the network can identify and react against corrupted devices.
• Resilient network: the system can recover itself in case of lost data or attacks.
• Scalability: the protocol can manage a large number of devices with a minimal footprint.
We achieve the aforementioned goals by extending the concept of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) [42] . The work here presented is agnostic from the type of DHT protocol chosen; in our proof-of-concept, we opted for Chord [34] , [35] , [41] as groundwork upon which we built our solution. Every device is assumed to be equipped with small trusted anchors [24] , which contain and protect the algorithms required to SAFE d .
The paper revolves around the idea of distributing the proofs over the entire network using a DHT. Periodically, every device assumes the role of Verifier and challenges a random Prover to attest its status. Through the DHT, the devices collaborate to retrieve the original proof and validate the attestation report. To introduce resiliency, the same network maintains parallel DHTs (called overlays) through which the same proofs are replicated in different devices. SAFE d allows us to handle networks of heterogeneous devices that mount different applications with different types of proofs. Furthermore, spreading the proofs among all the devices allows us to: (i) remove the need for a single central authority and (ii) reduce the memory footprint in every device.
We implemented SAFE
d in the open-source Raspberry Pi 3 platform. We opted for this solution because its chip supports ARM TrustZone [40] , which is a standard trusted anchor largely used in other works [15] , [24] , [25] . Moreover, we performed a large-scale experimentation by simulating virtual devices through Docker containers. We conducted several attacks against both the platforms, encompassing software tampering, lost packets and corrupted devices. SAFE d recovered up to 99.7% of lost proofs and successfully protected 50 devices with a logarithmic communication overhead and memory footprint.
SAFE
d overcomes previous attestation solutions for network of IoT devices because its performances are not affected by the number of devices connected and it completely removes single point-of-failure by design. Furthermore, solid experimental results are proposed to support our claims. We believe that SAFE d will help developing more resilient networks of IoT devices and secure DHTs.
Contributions: To sum up, SAFE
d is a novel collaborative attestation for networks of heterogeneous IoT devices. It introduces new technical solutions to enhance security guarantees in DHTs with a detailed analysis of performances and limitations.
The open-source proof-of-concept implementation of SAFE d for Raspberry Pi 3 will be available at the link 1 . 1 We are willing to share the source code with the community upon acceptance or to provide it to the reviewers upon request via conference chairs Organization: The paper is organized as follow. First, we describe related works (Section II), introduce the background concepts (Section III), and discuss the threat model (Section IV). Then, we describe SAFE d (Section V), illustrate our proof-of-concept implementation (Section VI), and evaluate its performances and security guarantees (Section VII). Finally, we discuss SAFE d limitations (Section VIII) and conclude with final remarks (Section IX).
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss swarm RA (Section II-A) and DHTs protocols (Section II-B).
A. Swarm Remote Attestation
The first proposal of a cumulative attestation protocol for swarms of devices was proposed by Asokan et al. with SEDA [8] . The authors organize the devices in a spanning tree rooted at the Verifier. The attestation request is initiated by the Verifier and is forwarded down the tree by each node to its children; the resulting reports are then aggregated backward up to the root. This approach achieves a logarithmic complexity by dividing the burden of propagation and elaboration across all the devices. The proposal was extended by Ambrosin et al. with SANA [6] . They use a new schema called Optimistic Aggregate Signatures for a more efficient aggregation of reports. A further improvement was introduced by Carpent et al. with LISA [13] , which discusses two new protocols (LISAα and LISAs) and a new metric to measure the Quality of Swarm Attestation (QoSA). Overall, SAFE d outperforms these works for the following reasons: (i) it does not need a central Verifier to attest the network; (ii) it can handle timeouts during communication; (iii) it can handle losses by using parallel DHTs; (iv) it provides a fine-grain report for each device with low overhead; (v) it keeps security guarantees in presence of compromised nodes.
Previous works ruled out the detection of physical attacks. This limitation was resolved by Ahmad et al. who proposed DARPA [20] . They notice that a physical attack requires an adversary to remove a device from the network, thus causing a temporary disconnection. Therefore, they introduce a heartbeat protocol to synchronize all the devices so that losing a single heartbeat would raise an alarm. Kohnhäuser et al. improved physical-attack detection by introducing SCAPI [21] . This solution reduces the communication complexity of DARPA, identifies compromised devices and supports highly dynamic and partitioned network topologies. Both [21] , [20] are conceived as an extension for the other swarm attestation works and therefore they are not included by design inside the system. SAFE d , instead, detects physical tampering by tracking the communication timeouts during the protocol execution.
Abera et al. proposed DIAT [2] , which is an attestation schema for autonomous systems. In that work, the authors assume a network of homogeneous devices (e.g., a swarm of drones), which validate their own status without using a central Verifier. However, their approach is based on heuristics and requires a network of similar devices. On the contrary, SAFE d is based on analytical results and it can handle networks of heterogeneous devices in an autonomous fashion.
PASTA [22] is the first work that tries to spread the burden of verification across the entire network. In PASTA, the Provers periodically collaborate to generate the so-called tokens. Every token attests the integrity of all the nodes that participated in its generation and contains a timestamp to allow absence detection of a particular node. Tokens are validated using an aggregated signature based on a Schnorrbased multisignature scheme. Ibrahim et al. proposed US-AID [19] which combines continuous in-network attestation and Proofs-of-non-Absence to detect both software tampering and device disconnections. In order to achieve physical attacks detection, the previous protocols require a reliable read-only clock (RROC) in each device that should be loosely synchronized along the network. Moreover, their memory fingerprints depend on variables with uncertain values. SAFE d , instead, can detect physical attacks directly using communication timeouts and has a predictable memory usage.
To sum up, SAFE d overcomes previous related RA schemas for mainly four reasons: (i) we fully remove any central trusted authority in the network, (ii) we efficiently spread the proofs among the nodes, (iii) we produce finegrained reports of the devices' status, (iv) we do not rely on synchronized clocks for absence detection.
B. Distributed Hash Tables
In general, all DHTs have been designed to decentralize information (e.g., a file) and improve network performances and robustness. Furthermore, they are thought to be deployed in large networks, such as the Internet. However, these protocols do not consider security issues in their design. In the last years, researchers investigated security limitations of DHTs [23] , [30] , [17] , [32] . These works aim at improving different aspects of DHT protocols, however, they differ from SAFE d for different reasons:
• Context: they assume a large and dynamic network such as the Internet, while we focus on a more restricted physical area.
• Attacker model: they assume dishonest or churn nodes, while we improve trust in the nodes thanks to our security mechanisms.
• Defense strategies: they rely on statistical and cryptographic schema to improve trust in nodes [4] . However, their approaches simply increase the effort required to a potential attacker without resolving the problem by design.
We are the first to tackle DHT security issues in the context of attestation protocols, which is more concrete and practical w.r.t. previous works.
Another crucial aspect of DHTs regards the privacy of the data stored inside of it [27] , [36] . SAFE d enhances the privacy constraint by entirely encrypting the traffic and protecting the sensitive memory locations inside every device.
To sum up, SAFE d improves DHT security guarantees by exploiting trusted computing for specific scenarios (i.e., IoT). Also, we believe that our solutions can be adopted to mitigate similar threats in more general scenarios.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the background knowledge needed for SAFE d . We introduce RA procedures (Section III-A), trusted computing technologies (Section III-B), and Chord protocol (Section III-C).
A. Remote Attestation
Remote Attestation (RA) schema refers to those protocols that allow verifying the integrity of a remote entity. Usually, they involve two distinct roles: Verifier and Prover. The Verifier is considered trusted and is usually physically protected from attacks (e.g., a remote server). Its duty is to verify the integrity of a Prover that may be corrupted (e.g., due to a malware). RA schemes require a Verifier to start the protocol by sending a challenge to the Prover, which measures some properties of its state (e.g., compute a hash of a piece of software) and returns a report. The Verifier is now able to validate the Prover status according to the returned report by comparing its value with a database of correct measurements (called proofs).
The classic approach involves static measurements, such as software fingerprint or hardware integrity [16] . More recently, researchers proposed a dynamic type of RA defined dynamic [1] , [2] , [38] , which tries to attest run-time properties such execution-paths. SAFE d focuses on static RA. However, we discuss possible dynamic RA integration strategies in Section VIII.
B. Trusted Anchor
Modern RA schema requires devices to mount specialized hardware called trusted anchors. These technologies allow to define protected memory regions and build Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). A TEE provides secure functionalities such as secure cryptographic algorithms and secure random number generators. In this work, we employed TrustZone [40] as trusted anchor because it provides advanced features such as dynamic memory allocation. A device equipped with TEE organizes its memory in two main zones: trusted and untrusted, respectively known in ARM TrustZone jargon as secure world and normal world. The normal world, as the name suggests, contains the general purpose software needed for running a classic operating system. The secure world, instead, contains the code strictly necessary for establishing a trusted execution inside the normal world, i.e., the secure world checks the execution of the normal world.
SAFE
d implementation is placed inside the secure world to protect its algorithms and critical variables (e.g., cryptographic keys). We opted for ARM TrustZone for our proof-of-concept implementation due to its flexibility and its wide spread. These technologies stand as the base of modern RA schema in IoT devices and classic IT infrastructure.
C. Chord
Chord [34] , [35] is a lookup protocol to establish a DHT and is specifically designed for large peer-to-peer networks. It uses consistent hashing for handling positions of nodes and data within the network, i.e., , each element of the network is identified by an m-bit identifier computed by a hash function.
The nodes are arranged around a circle module 2 m . Every piece of data is saved inside the first node whose identifier is greater than or equal to its identifier. As a consequence of this setting, a device will store all the piece of data whose ID is between its ID and that of the preceding device. Each node is linked to its predecessor and successor, thus establishing a ring. To improve resilience, a device also maintains a list of immediate successors, called successors list.
Having the devices and data organized in a ring makes possible to implement a look up function as follows: (i) device A sends a request with the data ID to its successor B, (ii) if B contains the data (i.e., ID < B), it is returned to A, otherwise it forwards the request to its successor. The step is repeated till finding the ID.
The complexity of this solution is linear with the number of nodes placed inside the ring. To improve the performances, Chord introduces a finger table that contains additional routing information. The finger table has m entries called fingers: the i-th finger is a reference to the 2 i−1 position ahead the current node. As a result, the finger table allows an average searching complexity of O(log 2 N ), making the look up operation scalable with respect to the number of nodes N .
Chord also provides procedures for adding new nodes to the ring and maintaining the order in case of failures. We referred to [41] for the implementation of a simpler yet correct version based on three distinct operations:
• Join: the outside node contacts a member of the ring (defined as the entry) to know which is its successor. It then contacts its successor to update the successor list.
• Stabilize: the node asks to its successor information about the predecessor. It adopts this predecessor as its new successor if it is actually closer than the current successor in the ring order. In both cases, the node sends a final notification to the successor. The successors list is updated with the information coming from the contacted nodes.
• Rectify: in case of a received notification, the node checks if its current predecessor is still alive and then adopts the notifying member as new predecessor if it is closer than the current predecessor or if it has no live predecessor.
A node executes the join procedure just when entering the network. Stabilize and rectify procedures are instead periodically triggered during the protocol routine. SAFE d builds on top of an enhanced version of Chord, in which a joining node can save its attestation data inside the network and the routine operations take care of re-distributing the information when new nodes join the ring. More importantly, SAFE d introduces redundancy of data by running several Chord instances at the same time, thus dealing with the loss of information caused by failures or attacks.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries regarding devices architecture (Section IV-A), network context (Section IV-B) and threat model (Section IV-C).
A. Device Architecture
The devices considered in SAFE d are equipped with a trusted anchor (i.e., ARM TrustZone), which is considered secure. The secure world is physically isolated from the rest of the system and its duties are twofold: (i) inspect and measure the device memory and (ii) communicate with the other trusted anchors in the network. The trusted anchor is used as a secure storage for all the variables needed by SAFE d and it is protected from an attacker by design. The normal world runs different applications and can be compromised.
B. Network Context
In this work, we assume networks of fully interconnected devices that range from few elements (around 10) to some hundreds. Our main use case is for industry, however, we can deploy SAFE d to any type of autonomous system networks. SAFE d can handle highly dynamic networks where nodes continuously enter and exit them. However, we allow only known devices to join the network. This is reasonable since we consider geographically restricted networks (e.g., factories or smart-homes).
C. Threat Model

SAFE
d faces attacks that target both the device and the network.
Device Attacks: The goal of the attacker is to load unauthorized binaries or inject malicious code inside the normal world by using different strategies, e.g., exploiting security flaws. We consider the secure world isolated from the normal one and therefore out of the attacker range. We also consider compromised devices that hide their presence in the network and physical attacks.
Network Attacks: An attacker can manipulate network traffic by following classic Dolev-Yao model [14] , thus she can eavesdrop, insert, modify and delete messages exchanged, perform a replay attack or forge attestation messages.
In general, we do not consider denial-of-service (DoS), however we evaluate the resilience of SAFE d in case of unavailable devices. These assumptions are coherent with previous works [8] , [6] , [13] , [2] , [19] , [22] .
d protocol relies on a DHT to store and spread the proofs throughout the network. However, the DHT protocols proposed till now are not designed to face many of the security issues arising during an attestation process. Therefore, our protocol introduces novel solutions to achieve the following requirements:
• Availability: all the proofs have to be available during the attestation phase even in case of faults or attacks.
• Integrity and confidentiality: the attacker cannot observe or be able to modify the proofs.
• Scalability: the proofs must be equally spread across the network and retrievable in a scalable time.
• Proofs location opacity: an attacker should not be able to locate the positions of the proofs inside the network.
In the rest of the section, we provide a system overview (Section V-A). We show the encryption schema adopted (Section V-B) and the protocol itself (Section V-C). We discuss the challenges faced (Section V-D and Section V-E) and at last we describe the attestation task (Section V-F).
A. Overview
We consider two logical parallel networks ( Figure 1 ). The first one is the normal network (dashed line), used by ordinary applications to communicate with other devices. The second one is SAFE d -net (solid-line arrows), built on top of the normal network and used by the trusted anchors to perform the protocol routines.
SAFE
d -net is an extension of Chord algorithm (Section III-C) where the devices participate in multiple DHTs instances, called overlays. Each overlay is composed by all the network devices and contains exactly one copy of each proof. The purpose of the overlays is twofold: (i) the number of overlays identifies the redundancy (i.e., X independent proof copies requires X overlays) and (ii) the number of overlays helps keeping the proofs distribution balanced.
The location of objects inside SAFE d is managed through two types of ID:
• Overlay ID (OID): identifies a device inside an overlay.
Therefore, a device has a different OID for each overlay.
• Unique ID (UID): identifies a proof of a device. It is the same for all the overlays.
We can explain the usage of these IDs by means of an example. Assume SAFE d has two overlays. Therefore, we assign three IDs to a device D, namely D OID1 , D OID2 , and D UID . The first two (i.e., D OID1 and D OID2 ) identify the position of D inside the two overlays respectively. The last one (i.e., D UID ) identifies the position of its proof in each overlay. The OIDs are computed online when the device enters the network. In Section V-B, we describe the OID creation process that makes them random and applicable as public keys in a secure communication protocol. The UID, instead, is computed offline and is used as the key for retrieving the proof from the various overlays during an attestation process. We indicate UID and proof as a key/value pair (UID, proof). The motivation behind our design choice is that in this way an attacker does not know the order of the devices around the ring. As a result, even if the UID is predictable, an external attacker cannot foresee which device contains the proof linked with it.
B. Secure Device Communication
SAFE
d introduces a novel protocol schema that allows two devices to share a symmetric key K with zero-message exchanged. Our approach overcomes previous ones [19] , [22] that either requires a device to store every key needed for the communication or to execute a key exchange protocol to establish a secure channel. The schema is based on Diffie Hellman [33] and exploits Chord protocol properties. The idea is that each OID represents the public key of a device that joined an overlay. In Section V-D, we discuss our mechanism to allow only authorized devices to enter the network.
In our protocol, we assume that all the devices share two secure prime number g and N . During the join phase, a device randomly computes an OID as follows:
At first, a device randomly computes a number X (modulo N ), which is kept secret within the trusted anchor. Then, it generates the OID by computing the exponentiation of X over g (modulo N ). These two operations are repeated for each overlay. For the sake of simplicity, we continue the description considering a single overlay, however it is possible to easily extend the approach to any number of overlays. We indicate the pair X, OID for a device D as follows:
Two devices, namely A and B, that know the respective OIDs can compute a shared symmetric key K AB as follows:
The key K AB can now be used in a symmetric encryption schema E.
The design of Chord assures that each device knows the OIDs of its successors (e.g., finger list and successor list). Therefore, if B is a device following A, B cannot compute K AB because it does not have knowledge of A OID . To overcome this problem, we need to send A OID to B avoiding unauthorized entities to read the OID. We achieve this by encrypting A OID such that only authorized devices can read it. The whole message structure is shown in the following:
which comprises three parts:
is the header and is encrypted by using a symmetric encryption schema E and B OID as a key 2 . This allows only the devices that are already participating the overlay (i.e., B) to read the content. The header contains two OIDs, called source and sender. The first identifies the device which originally sent the message (i.e., S OID ), while the second identifies the device which is currently forwarding the message to B (i.e., A OID ). Keeping the source OID permits a fast reply; this will be described later through an example.
• E K AB [M ] is the message body. It contains the message M to deliver and is encrypted with the symmetric schema E and K AB as a key.
• O indicates the overlay to which the message is meant to and is sent as plain text.
This structure enables B to decrypt an incoming message as follow:
• reads O and identify from which overlay is coming.
• uses the corresponding OID (i.e., B OID ) to decrypt the header and to retrieve the sender OID (e.g., A OID ).
• compute K AB and decrypt M .
A packet structured in such way has three interesting properties: (i) besides the overlay O, no information is shipped as a plain text, thus only Member devices can read the headers (see Section V-D); (ii) only the intended recipient can successfully decrypt the message, thus any attempt to manipulate or reroute the message will generate an error; (iii) a symmetric schema is less expensive than an asymmetric one, thus more suitable for low-power devices. Figure 2 shows a complete example of two devices that communicate. In this case, device A wants to send a message M to device C, but C is not directly reachable by A. Therefore, A must pass through the ring. At the beginning, A only knows the OID of B, because it is its successor. Therefore, A asks B to deliver M to C by creating packet (1) as follows:
In this packet, source and sender OID coincide with A OID . B decrypts the header with its OID, calculates K AB using the 2 Since the key space of E is generally smaller than the size of B OID , we use a hash function H to adjust the size, i.e., E H(B OID ) [.] sender OID and obtains the message M . Since B knows C, B relays the message crafted as follows:
C follows similar steps to retrieve message M and serves the request. At this point, C replies to A by using the source OID (i.e., A OID ) and crafting message (3) as follows:
Finally, A receives the response from C.
This approach brings three advantages: (i) we avoid spoofing attacks because the sender is automatically verified (unless the attacker stoles its secret X), (ii) we can build a symmetric key without using extra messages, and (iii) a compromised device cannot choose its OIDs arbitrarily unless it resolves the discrete algorithm. We also mitigate reply attacks by using nonces [43] .
C. Protocol • Device-setting defines the initial device configuration.
• Device-unknown and Certification allow only recognized devices to join the network (Section V-D).
• Non-member and Proofs update are used to enhance availability of data in our dynamic context (Section V-E).
• Attestation is used to monitor the integrity of other devices inside the network (Section V-F).
As a whole, SAFE d protocol is composed by two distinct phases: Offline and Online.
During the Offline phase, we boot the devices and set the following parameters inside the trusted anchor:
• The pair (UID, proof), which will be saved inside the network and later used for attestation/verification. • A public/private key pair which are signed by a certification authority (CA).
• The CA certificate for the key pair.
During the Online phase, a device in Device-unknown status connects to the network and starts the procedure to join SAFE d -net. We introduced this phase because Chord does not handle authentication by default. After the Certification is done, a device enters the Device-certified status and it can join each overlay asynchronously. A device that does not pass the Certification cannot physically communicate with other devices because it does not receive any OIDs from the entry point. The following procedure is repeated for every overlay. During the join phase, a device finds its successor around the ring by following standard Chord algorithms. It then sends its pair (UID, proof) to be stored. After this task is completed, the device assumes a Non-member status, which means that: (i) the device is aware of its position around the ring, (ii) it has inserted its own proof inside the overlay and (iii) it has not received yet the proofs it has to store. At this point, the device performs its first stabilize operation, making its successor aware of its presence inside the overlay. This triggers the Proofs update, which consists in the successor sending a copy of the proofs that should be stored inside the new device. A node maintains Non-member status until it is completely integrated inside the ring, i.e., the preceding and following devices becomes aware of it. When this is the case, it has become officially part of the overlay and it can switch to the Member status. This allows the device to perform the Rectify operation as described in the original Chord protocol and permits to the successor to safely delete the proofs previously copied. It is fundamental to maintain different Member status for each overlay because the Attestation process involves all the overlays. Therefore, we require a device to become Member in all of them before being able to execute it, thus reaching Member-and-Running status.
D. Certification Phase
This phase allows an entry point N to recognize the identity of a device U , which is in Device-unknown status, by using a public key infrastructure (PKI). Figure 4 describes the protocol. All the devices are initialized during the Offline phase and receive a private key (e.g., N PRV ) and the corresponding certificate (e.g., N CERT ), signed by a certification authority (CA). The procedure uses a generic asymmetric encryption schema denoted as E.
The protocol starts with U that generates a nonce r and U N r ←Nonce() sends it along with its certificate (i.e., U CERT ||r) to N . After N correctly verifies the signature of U CERT , it encrypts all of its OIDs and the nonce r (i.e., [N OID ||r]) by first using the public key of U (i.e., U PUB ) and then its private key (i.e., N PRV ). Finally, N sends them back to U along with its certificate (i.e., N CERT ). At this point, U performs the following operations: (i) verifies the certificate of N (i.e., N CERT ) using the CA public key, (ii) verifies the public key of N using the certificate and removes first encryption with it, (iii) extracts the OIDs of N (i.e., [N OID ]) and nonce (i.e., r ) using its own private key, (iv) checks the nonce r and r to avoid replay attacks, (v) generates its own OIDs (i.e., [U OID ]), and (vi) sets its status to Device-certified. The double encription guarantees two properties: (i) the public key of U ensures that only U can decrypt the message and, (ii) the private key of N ensures that the message has been sent by N . From this point ahead, U can communicate with the entry point by using the encryption schema described in Section V-B. More precisely, U joins the overlays as described in Chord. A device that does not pass the Certification phase cannot receive the OIDs of the entry point, and therefore, it cannot communicate with the other devices. To protect from the leakage of the private key during physical attacks, it is fundamental to implement a certificate revocation procedure. We discuss possible solutions in Section VIII.
E. Multiple Device Entrance
We designed Non-member status and Proof update task to handle the entrance of group of devices while keeping the proofs available. Figure 5 shows the main four steps of Proof update, that begins when a new device C enters in an overlay. The rectangle before the node letter is a representation of the proofs stored inside of it. In step 1, we assume having two devices A and B correctly distributed around the overlay (i.e., A OID < B OID ). In step 2, C has just joined and it has found its position between A and B (i.e., A OID < C OID < B OID ). In this step, C is in Non-member status and it can only perform stabilize. This allows us to handle the entrance of multiple devices simultaneously and will be described later. In step 3, B copies into C the relative proofs while keeping a temporary copy in B itself. Keeping a copy of the proofs into B enables the other devices to find the C proofs even though C has not entered the ring yet. In step 4, A performs rectify and inserts C as its successor. C is formally part of the overlay and consequently it can shift to Member status, while B can delete its leftover proofs. After step 4, C starts performing rectify. When C becomes Member in all the overlays, it reaches Member-and-running status and starts performing/receiving attestations.
This approach allows us to handle group of devices that enter simultaneously. For instance, a new device D may attempt entering while C is still a Non-member. Here, we distinguish two cases: (i) D is located between A and C (i.e., A OID < D OID < C OID ) and sets C as successor ; (ii) D is located between C and B (i.e., C OID < D OID < B OID ) and sets B as successor. In both cases, D is kept as Non-member until its successor becomes Member as well. The difference is just in the order in which the devices become Member. In case (i), D receives Member status from C, therefore, the entrance order is C, then D. In case (ii), D receives Member status from B, while C changes its successor to D after doing a stabilize to B. Generally, Member status is assigned only by other Member (or Member-and-running) devices, which are considered stable. We keep rectify disabled while a device is Non-member to avoid the formation of chains of devices that would cause some of them to have outdated list of proofs.
F. Attestation Protocol
SAFE
d attestation process is an extension of classic RA (Section III-A). The main differences are essentially two: (i) we consider all devices both Prover and Verifier, and (ii) the proofs are spread among all devices. The entire attestation process is implemented in a dedicated phase, which is routinely executed by any device inside the network. In our implementation, the task is triggered by a function located inside the normal world. This is necessary because TrustZone secure OS is passive and needs to be called from outside the secure world. However, this does not affect the efficacy of the protocol because an attacker cannot disable the attestation trigger without being detected by other participants in the protocol. The attestation is composed as follows:
• Verifier election: when the attestation is triggered, the device elects itself as Verifier.
• Prover election: the device generates a random OID R in a random overlay. The successor of OID R is elected as Prover.
• Attestation request: the Verifier sends a challenge to the Prover passing through the ring.
• Retrieve report: the Prover measures itself and returns a report defined as (UID, HASH) to the Verifier. The UID is used to retrieve the proofs from the overlays, while the HASH is the current self-measure of the Prover, which can be corrupted.
• Retrieve proofs: the Verifier queries all overlays to retrieve the proofs using the received UID. The proofs will be used to control the report.
• Voting: we use a First Past The Post (FTPT) voting schema [3] to decide the healthy status of the Prover.
In case of compromised status, the Verifier reacts in a proper way (see Attack Reaction below).
• Recovery: in case of missing proofs, the Verifier uses the retrieved data to recover the information where it has been lost. In case no overlay returned the proof, the Verifier launches a warning of possible infection for that particular device.
Voting: FTPT is a plurality voting system that elects the most voted choice as the winner. During the voting phase, the Verifier considers the proofs collected from the various overlays as a preference vote, i.e., which state each overlay thinks is the correct one. At first, the Verifier evaluates all the missing proofs as blank votes and it does not consider them in the counting. Then, the Verifier chooses the correct proof by picking the one that was returned the highest number of times. The elected proof is then used to verify the report sent by the Prover. The devices whose vote disagreed with the elected proof are considered infected as well.
Despite its simplicity, FTPT shows in our case resilience against manipulation. An attacker cannot foresee the location of the proofs in the network. As a result, the voting is robust till at least 50% devices are healthy. Due to the design of SAFE d , we can easily implement new type of voting schema.
Attack Reaction: The actual attack reaction strategy strictly depends by the network pursue. In our prototype, we isolate the corrupted devices. In other scenarios, for instance, we can implement an hard-reset of the device. This can be useful for malware such as Mirai [7] . It is also possible to save the attestation results in the overlays for future manual inspections.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION Figure 6 shows the architecture adopted for the platform Raspberry Pi 3. We developed our prototype on top of OP-TEE [26] 3 and wrote it using C language. Since we designed SAFE d to exploit ARM TrustZone features (Section III-B), we split SAFE d into two components: untrusted and trusted application. The untrusted application interacts with the peripherals, while the trusted application contains SAFE d code and the private information. The network communication is implemented through a TCP client and server socket in the normal world 4 . SAFE d workflow is composed by a number of independent steps, which are depicted in Figure 6 . In the beginning, SAFE d waits for an incoming packet from the server socket (step 1). Once a packet arrives, it is sent into the trusted application (step 2). At this point, the packet is decrypted (step 3) and processed (step 4). After the response is created, it is encrypted (step 5) and written into the untrusted application along with the destination IP (step 6), which must be in plain text for correct routing. Finally, the packet is shipped by the client socket (step 7). The packets are built in such a way that the untrusted application knows only the destination IP, while the content is always encrypted as described in Section V-B. An attacker that alters the plain-text IP would simply lead to a trashed or lost message because the only device capable of decrypting it is the intended recipient (see Section V-B). Moreover, blocking the message would cause the original sender to raise a warning for a timeout in its communications, thus exposing the attack.
Our prototype requires around 46KLoC for the untrusted application and around 49KLoC for the trusted application. We used AES-CBC [37] for symmetric encryption with keys 32B long, while we used RSA [10] for the asymmetric keys in the certification phase with 1218B for the private key and 294B for the public one.
Availability Issues and Mitigation:
We mitigate trusted anchors availability issues by blinding the operations of the trusted application. This is achieved as follows: (i) the trusted application exposes a single entry point (i.e., a single function to invoke); (ii) the trusted application randomly decides the operation to perform only when it is inside the secure world. This means that the normal world can only invoke the trusted application without knowing what is happening inside. Therefore, an attacker cannot interrupt a single action (e.g., the attestation request) without blocking the entire application. Although this approach requires always having pending packets to process, this is not a real problem because the devices continuously exchange packets. Therefore, an attacker is encouraged to activate the trusted anchor to avoid detection.
Measurement Generation: SAFE
d protects the integrity of critical pieces of software inside the normal world by using a shared memory. The location to protect is identified at the boot phase. For the sake of simplicity, our proof-of-concept can monitor memory regions that reside in the same process of SAFE d . It is still possible to extend SAFE d to read arbitrary physical addresses and protect the integrity of different parts of the system [39] .
Docker Porting: We ported our prototype implementation into Docker containers to perform large scale performance analysis, while the strict security analysis was conducted on the Raspberry PIs' network. We implemented the porting by moving the trusted application in a standard user-space, while the rest remained unchanged. In this case, we used the standard Ubuntu image for Docker containers as a base.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate different metrics of SAFE d . First, we measure the network overhead (Section VII-A) and memory footprint (Section VII-B). Then, we measure how the proofs get distributed among the devices (Section VII-C) and the resilience of the network in the presence of attacks (Section VII-D). Finally, we discuss SAFE d security properties (Section VII-E).
Network Settings: Before we describe the experiments and the relative results we illustrate the networks settings used for our experiments.
• Raspberry Pi: we mounted a small network of Raspberry Pi 3 composed by 4 devices. This setting was used to measure the performances of SAFE d with different combination of overlays and a fixed number of devices. Moreover, the Raspberry Pis was useful to prove the protocol claims on real devices.
• Docker: we mounted a virtual network composed by various number of Docker containers (from 10 to 50), each of them representing a device. We used this setting to measure the performances of SAFE d with larger number of devices and a fixed number of overlays.
A. Network Overhead
We measure the network overhead introduced by SAFE Global Messages Exchanged.: Figure 7a shows the average number of messages exchanged per second (i.e., msg/sec) with different network settings. In our implementation, we handle two types of message:
• Certification messages: they are used only during the certification phase (Section V-D) and require 256 × o bytes, where o is the number of overlays (e.g., 1KB for 4 overlays). These messages are more expensive in terms of size but they are only used during the Certification Phase.
• Routine messages: the other messages exchanged in our prototype have a fixed size of 384 bytes plus 68 × s bytes, where s is the successor list size (e.g., 520B with 2 successors). They compose the vast majority of the network communication. Furthermore, s is a fixed parameter of the network, thus the message size remains constant throughout the execution.
We measured the messages exchanged by tuning two properties. We varied the number of overlays from 2 to 8 on the Raspberry Pi network (dotted line), while we varied the number of devices from 10 to 50 on the Docker network (solid line). The results from the Raspberry Pi network show a linear growth of the number of messages with the increase of the overlays. We measured around 2.5 msg/sec by using 4 devices and 2 overlays, till reaching around 9 msg/sec by using 4 devices an 8 overlays. This result is intuitive because each overlay works independently, and therefore, they require a separate set of messages for their operations. A different behavior is, instead, observed for the Docker network, that shows a logarithmic growth of the number of messages with the increase of the devices. In this case, we measured up to 2msg/sec on average with 50 devices and a single overlay. This pattern is a consequence of Chord algorithm, which scales well in terms of network size.
To sum up, the network overhead introduced by SAFE d scales logarithmically with the number of devices. Previous works [19] , [22] do not propose an analysis for the network overhead. However, the security of their communication channels relies on the prior execution of a key exchange protocol between each pair of devices that needs to exchange data. Considering that a device needs to communicate with every neighbour, we can infer that the overall complexity for the network is at least quadratic on the average number of neighbour a device has inside the network.
Message Time Elapsed:
We measure the time required to process a single message in a Raspberry Pi. We did not considered the Certification messages phase because they are used only during the initial part of the protocol. We also ignored Docker containers performances because we focus on real device scenarios. As a result, any message required on average 9.1ms (with a standard deviation of 6.3) to be processed without using cryptography, while around the double, 18ms (with a standard deviation of 9.2), using the cryptography described in Section V-B. As already observed in [19] , [22] , the cryptography is the predominant part during the protocol execution.
B. Memory Footprint
Each device uses 64, 1218, 294 and 256 bytes respectively for the UID, the private RSA key, the public RSA key and the certificate. For each overlay, it uses 32 bytes for the secret, 68 bytes for its own OID and its predecessor OID, 68 bytes for each entry in the successor list, 68 bytes for the entries in the finger list and 128 bytes for each element inside the proof storage. The overall memory usage M , expressed in bytes, can be computed as follows:
where s is the size of the successor list, f is the size of the finger table, p is the number of proofs and o the number of overlays. The size of the successor list s is a fixed parameter that remains constant during the protocol execution. The finger list size f , instead, has an upper bound of log(n), with n the total number of devices inside the network. In Figure 7b , we support the previous claim analyzing the finger table size in both Raspberry Pi (dashed line) and Docker (solid line) networks. This table is used by Chord to optimize packets routing (see Section III-C). Each overlay maintains a separate table, and their entries represent other devices in the same overlay. Similarly to the global message exchanged, we observe two patterns. For the Raspberry Pi network, the finger table grows linearly. It ranges from around 0.3KB, for 4 devices and 2 overlays, to around 1.2KB, for 4 devices and 8 overlays. This pattern is linear because each device maintains a separate table for each overlay. On the other hand, the Docker network's size grows logarithmically reaching up to 0.3KB, for 50 devices and a single overlay. This is because the finger table by design contains at most a logarithmic number of entries with respect to the network size.
To sum up, the space required for each device till now is scalable because it requires an amount of memory which is logarithmic with the number of devices. In the next paragraph, we will discuss the number of proofs p that a device is expected to store.
C. Proofs Spreading
We analyze the proofs distribution in a network from two perspectives: at first, we discuss the proofs distribution in presence of a single overlay; then, we analyze the case with smaller networks and multiple overlays. Figure 7d shows an analysis of the proofs distribution in a single overlay. To calculate the distribution, we considered the distances between each pair of consecutive proofs. The normalized distance is shown in the y-axis of the plot, while the x-axis shows the number of proofs present inside the overlay. To give a comprehensive view, we propose four different curves: (i) the ideal distance as a thin-dashed line, (ii) the minimum distance as a dot-dashed line, (iii) the average distance as a solid line, and (iv) the maximum distance as a bold-dashed line. We observe that the average normalized distance remains close to the ideal case, while the maximum normalized distance converges towards it. At 50 proofs, the overlay reaches an average distance of 5% with a maximum distance of 10%. The trend shows that a more crowded overlay brings to a more uniform distribution of proofs. This is due to the location of both devices and proofs that is regulated by random identifier, i.e., OIDs and UIDs. In fact, a random process is supposed to generate a roughly uniform distribution after enough extractions, that we empirically estimated being around 50 proofs.
Having independent and random proofs helps obtaining a uniform distribution for smaller networks (e.g., 10 devices) by tuning the number of overlays. Each overlay is indeed completely independent from the others. Thus, we can consider the nodes that populate a particular overlay as separate entities from the others. This means that, in case of networks with 10 devices, we can balance the distribution of the proofs by setting 5 overlays. In this way, we reach a population of 50 independent entities.
To sum up, the number of proofs p that a device stores is bounded and can be forced to reach the ideal value (i.e., 1 proofs for each overlay) even in small networks. Considering the overall memory consumption, SAFE d is a clear improvement with respect to previous works that are either an order of magnitude more expensive [22] or have a quadratic dependence on unpredictable parameters [19] .
D. Resilience
The purpose of this experiment is to measure the ability of SAFE d of recovering missing proofs in case of attacks or faults. We performed this measurement using the Raspberry Pi network. Furthermore, we modeled a powerful attacker that randomly destroys all the proofs of a device. This attack is tuned by a drop rate which indicates the probability of a device to erase its own proofs on all overlays. For instance, a drop rate of 5% means that each device will randomly erase its own proofs during 5 operations out of 100 on average. We tested different combination of drop rate and number of overlays to observe the different responses. Figure 7c shows the results of our experiments. We varied the drop rate from 5% to 30%, which means that in the worst case each device removed all of its own proofs one out of three operations. The overlays, instead, ranged from 2 to 8. The yaxis shows the resilience index, which is the ratio between the number of proofs correctly recovered and the number of non-retrieved proofs. According to the attestation algorithm (Section V-F), in case of non-retrieved proofs, the Verifier attempts to recover the missing information from the other overlays. Therefore, the resilience index tends to 100 if all the proofs were correctly recovered, otherwise it goes to 0. The plot shows that with the increases of the overlays, the resilience index tends to reach 100 even in presence of an high drop rate. More precisely, we manage to recover 99.7% of the proofs with 8 overlays. Overall, the resilience index stays above 97.2% by using only 4 overlays with a drop rate of 20%.
This experiment shows that the overlays can be effectively used to recover the network in the presence of attacks, even though the network is small.
E. Security Consideration
We describe how SAFE d reacts against different attacker scenarios.
Tampered Devices: An attacker may infect a device and take control of it. Since we use a trusted anchor, we consider the secure world as protected, while the normal world can be under attacker control. Therefore, SAFE d protocol is protected by design. Moreover, all the packets that transit through the normal world are encrypted, thus outside the attacker range. However, an attacker may avoid invoking trusted anchor code by compromising normal world scheduler. We mitigate this problem by adopting a blind scheduling (Section VI) that avoids an attacker to disable a specific SAFE d operation (e.g., attestation) without stopping the entire device, thus being detected.
To test SAFE d effectiveness, we verified that the other devices are able to spot the modified code inside the normal world.
Attacks against the Network: All the messages exchanged among trusted anchors are encrypted (Section V-B) and only devices that joined the network can communicate among each other (Section V-D). Man-in-the-middle [9] attacks are mitigated by design: (i) the body is protected by the symmetric key K AB , (ii) the header can be manipulated only by the trusted anchors of authorized devices. We also include nonces to avoid replay attacks. This enhances robustness even in case of corrupted devices as long as their trusted anchor remains intact.
Physical attacks: According to DARPA attacker model [20] , a device which receives a physical attack is temporarily removed from the network. Previous authors [20] , [21] , [22] proposed to use a heartbeat to keep the devices synchronized. In this way, a device that goes temporarily off-line cannot get aligned with the heartbeat, and therefore, enabling the detection of the attack. However, establishing a heartbeat protocol implies the presence of loosely synchronized and secure clocks in every device. SAFE d overcomes this requirement by using the communication timeouts and nonces to detect network disconnections. During the protocol execution, each device periodically contacts its successor to assess its status. In case a timeout occurs, the device uses the successor list to contact the closest node following the old one. The contacted device will further check if its predecessor left the network, and if so, it will acquire the message sender as new predecessor, while launching an alert for a possible physical attack. The double check adds robustness against simple network malfunctions. To enhance the protection against physical attacks, we further propose a certificate revocation strategy that will be discussed in Section VIII.
Denial-of-Service: We do not protect against denialof-service in case of an entire compromised network (e.g., all the messages are dropped). However, we can recover partial information loss by combining multiple overlays and our attestation protocol (Section VII-D).
VIII. DISCUSSION
We discuss some aspects of SAFE d that can be further developed or improved as future works.
Certificate Revocation: SAFE d security properties can be further improved by adopting an efficient certificate revocation mechanism. This feature can be useful in at least three scenarios: (i) if the CA private key gets compromised (e.g., leaked), (ii) if a software is updated and (iii) if a device is corrupted. The design of a scalable and efficient certificate revocation procedure was already addressed by [18] , [28] that proposed solutions based on Bloom filters [11] . Furthermore, [5] proposed a way to make a Bloom filter scalable, i.e., to make its capacity adaptable at runtime so that it can be increased without stopping the general execution. It is possible to implement in SAFE d a certificate revocation protocol that is scalable and distributed based on the previous citations.
Run-time Attacks: An attacker could alter the application behavior without modifying the binary by using run-time attacks [12] . A way to cope with those threats is using run-time remote attestation [38] , [1] that can verify run-time properties, e.g., the current execution path. Usually, these solutions require several proofs to be stored. We can use the DHTs in SAFE d to spread the proof load among devices. We leave this as a future work.
Run-time Software Upgrade: In specific cases (e.g., industrial IoT), we need to upgrade devices software without interrupting the network. In SAFE d , we do not deal with this case, but it is possible to mitigate this issue by using two main approaches: (i) we could introduce new upgraded devices in the network and remove the old ones until all the network is upgraded, (ii) we integrate specific upgrade protocols in SAFE d that load new software and substitute the proofs in the DHTs. Regardless the strategy adopted, the software upgrade strategy should be integrated with a strong certificate revocation mechanisms to avoid an attacker to reupload old and vulnerable software.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed SAFE d , the first concrete selfattestation for networks of heterogeneous embedded devices. SAFE d maintains multiple copies of the proofs among the devices, which are equipped with small trusted anchors. We also designed and developed new techniques that enhance classic DHT protocols against powerful adversaries, which are typical of remote attestation scenarios.
SAFE
d allows performing remote attestations without the need of a powerful Verifier, and consequently removing a single point of failure. SAFE d coordinates multiple devices to self-protect the network and also to self-recover in presence of attackers and faults. These properties are achieved in a scalable manner introducing a logarithmic network traffic and device memory footprint.
We implemented a prototype of SAFE d in the opensource platform Raspberry Pi 3, allowing us to show the technical challenges faced to implement SAFE d in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Moreover, we performed a large scale measurement by using a virtual network of Docker containers. As a result, we showed the feasibility of our approach in terms of performances and security guarantees.
We think SAFE d will help researchers and companies develop more autonomous and secure IoT network.
